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F.: Evidence--Admissibility of Evidence of Sperate Independent Crimes
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

situation. One solution would be the revival of the term "quasijurisdictional facts" as distinguished from "jurisdictional facts."
However, to c6ntinue with the term "jurisdictional facts" would
not solve the problem of confusion resulting when the term is not
recognized for its technical definition. Thus, the problem would
continue as it exists now. Probably, a better solution would be to
define facts pertaining to jurisdiction as either primary or secondary. This would alleviate the semantic aspects of the problem
and at the same time point out that there are different levels of
facts concerning jurisdiction.
J. Me K.
EvImEcE-AiAssmnxrY OF EvmuEcE OF SEPAATE INDEPENDCmm.-The defendant was accused of poisoning her nineyear-old daughter for collection of life insurance and other financial
benefits. Testimony of witnesses showing that the defendant, for a
money motive and in a like manner, had poisoned two previous husband; and her mother-in-law, and that the defendant had collected
a substantial amount of money from the death of each, was admitted
to show common motive, plan or scheme. Defendant brought error.
Held, generally, on a prosecution for a specific crime, evidence of a
wholly independent one is irrelevant and inadmissible, however,
it is admissible to show the commission of other crimes if it is to
show motive, plan, or scheme. Judgment affirmed. Lyles v. State,
109 S.E.2d 785 (Ga. 1959).
The rule today is that evidence of a prior conviction of an infamous crime which would have rendered a witness incompetent
at common law, or of a crime involving great moral turpitude, may
be admitted to impeach the credibility of a witness. United States
v. Monatgomery, 126 F.2d 151 (3d Cir. 1942). Fuller v. State, 147
Ala. 35, 41 So. 774 (1906). However, this is not the law when we
are dealing with a defendant rather than a witness in a criminal trial.
There is a well established general rule that proof in a criminal
prosecution which shows or tends to show the accused is guilty of
committing other offenses at other times, even if they are of the same
nature as the one charged, is incompetent and inadmissible for the
purpose of showing the commission of the crime charged. Guilbeau
v. United States, 288 Fed. 731 (5th Cir. 1923).
Like most general rules the above has certain well recognized
limitations and exceptions. Sykes v. State, 112 Tenn. 572, 82 S.W.
185 (1904). Evidence may be introduced of other crimes if it shows
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a common scheme, plan or system encompassing the commission of
the two or more crimes. Cooper v. State, 182 Ga. 42, 184 S.E. 716
(1936).
It has also been accepted that even though the other offenses
were remote in point of time from the act charged, evidence of these
may still be competent where they were all apparently inspired by
one purpose. Dietz v. State, 149 Wis. 462, 136 N.W. 166 (1912).
West Virginia in a large number of cases has upheld the general rule that evidence of separate independent offenses is inadmissible in trial of a person indicted for a specific offense. State v.
Light, 127 W. Va. 169, 31 S.E. 841 (1944). Evidence of separate
independent crimes has been held admissible to prove guilty knowledge and intent. State v. Barnhart,127 W. Va. 548, 33 S.E.2d 857
(1945). In dealing with the admissibility of evidence to show both
intent and a system of criminal action, it has been said in West
Virginia,
"In a criminal case proof of another offense chargeable to
the defendant is admissible to show motive or intent, if such
other offense is similar and near in point of time to, has some
logical connection with and tends to establish the commission
of the specific offense charged against the defendant and indicates that such offense is part of a system of criminal action."
State v. Hudson, 128 W. Va. 655, 37 S.E.2d 553 (1946).
Even in the cases that say that such evidence is admissible to show
intent and motive, it may not be used to prove the doing of the act
charged. State v. Evans, 136 W. Va. 1, 66 S.E.2d 545 (1951);
State v. Weeler, 123 W. Va. 279, 14 S.E.2d 677 (1941).
West Virginia does not seem to vary to any extent from the
majority except that it limits the other offenses that may be introduced to those that are near in point of time. The principal case
does not seem to be attempting to advance any new theory of evidence acceptability or admissibility either in the majority or in West
Virginia. The evidence was admitted to show that the motive for
the defendant's act was the collection of insurance which bad been
taken out on the deceased and also it was admitted because the
similar facts and circumstances of the preceding crimes were sufficient to show a common design and system. If the reasons put
forth by the court have placed the case within the exceptions, as it
seems to do, then the decision is in accord with accepted rules of
evidence.
M. J. F.

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol62/iss3/10

2

